John Rawls' conception of a reasonable pluralism proceeds on the epistemological assumption that it is not possible to set up one specific notion of justice attached to certain beliefs about the nature of the person, the purpose and the goal of human life. The liberal position insists on the principle of moral justification, according to which no norm is legitimate unless it can be accepted in principle by all affected persons. According to this view, is recommended, in public debates where the legitimacy of laws and state actions is being disputed, citizens should confine themselves to the use of religious arguments for which independent, secular reasons can be given. This conception has elicited an array of critical responses from authors of a religious persuasion. Critics point above all to the unequal terms of entry to public debates. But it can be shown in terms of a modest foundationalist epistemology that the required translation of religious beliefs in secular reasons is not an unfair and unjustified charge. Personally justified basic beliefs can be tested in intersubjective and public procedures of reasoning without requiring believers to sacrifice their religious or confessional identity.

Enthalten in:
Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik; 2001/4 Kommentare, Studien, Berichte, Dokumentationen, Diskussionen, Rezensionen, Bibliographie (2001)

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Serie / Reihe: Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik

Personen: Schmidt, Thomas M.

Schlagwörter: Politik Religion Ethik Öffentlichkeit Studie Liberalismus Religiöse Normen Argument