In the ethical debate, the focus has mostly been on what a lie is rather than how it is practically curried out. This paper discusses lying as a special case of the practice of deception. Deception is to be understood as a social action. Therefore, an ethical assessment from the perspectice of the "perpetrator" alone is insufficient. After u short "phenomenolgy" of deception, the classical arguments regarding the moral evaluation of lying are reconstructed. Here, deontological approaches, which understand lying as a misuse of language, are initially in the foreground. Opposed to this are theories that locate the problem more in the harm to third parties. Ultimately, this perspective alone can be defended as the central standard of evaluation. Finally, the possible practical application of the results is discussed using the example of dealing with people with dementia.

Enthalten in:
Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik; 2023/2 Kommentare, Studien, Berichte, Dokumentationen, Diskussionen, Rezensionen, Bibliographie (2023)

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Serie / Reihe: Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik

Personen: Dallmann, Hans-Ulrich

Schlagwörter: Moral Ethik Beurteilung Lüge Täuschung