This essay deals with the conditions of the possibility of forgiveness in the Kantian moral philosophy. The problem which arises concerning this subject is the thesis that interpersonal forgiveness can be thought of as being impossible. That position is based on the consideration that - speaking in accordance with Kant - there can be no moral surplus to be achieved by humans because it is always their duty to act in compliance with the moral law. This leads to the assumption that moral guilt can only be forgiven by God. But if God is the only one who can forgive human misbehaviour, and so take away the burden of moral guilt, wouldn't that undermine human freedom and personal autonomy? If interpersonal forgiveness was impossible, which consequences would result from that thesis for our moral and also for our political relations to each other?

Enthalten in:
Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik; 2013/1 Kommentare, Studien, Berichte, Dokumentationen, Diskussionen, Rezensionen, Bibliographie (2013)

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Serie / Reihe: Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik

Personen: Sturm, Nanina Marika

Schlagwörter: Vergebung Moralphilosophie Kant, Immanuel